1. Preliminary remarks

It is commonly understood that morals, morality, involve principles, rules, standards of human conduct stemming from a distinction between right and wrong, between good and evil. The term absolute morals here implies a certain "comprehensive," universal and unconditional normative code of morals, not dependent on time and circumstances. Whether such a moral code can exist in principle, what it might contain, and whether it is necessary to humanity - these are issues proposed for discussion in this paper.

A system, a set of moral principles collectively constitutes ethics - the science of how a human being should act. The source of ethics may be human society or God. In any case, while speaking of morals, we cannot abstract ourselves from religion - a force on which billions of people base their morality. Whether or not we believe in God, it is appropriate for us to examine any religious ethical principles (and even myths) alongside so-called materialistic notions. "The raising of an impervious wall between philosophical and religious ethics is predicated on the misconception that one of them is a science, and the other is not. In fact, this is true of neither; each is a form of thought," maintained Albert Schweitzer [1, p. 104]. Let us then, in the manner of Pope John Paul II, presume that "faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit ascends to contemplate truth" [2].

2. Development of ethics as a way to general humanist morals

Humanity has amassed endlessly rich and varied ethical experience, which includes divine revelations proclaimed by prophets as well as brilliant insights from secular philosophers. One of the most important issues to have occupied the minds of great thinkers is the question of absolute morals:"...Ethical thought has always sought to discover a universal basic principle for morality" [1, pp. 205]. Here, we can consider only a few key landmarks in tracing the path of the development of this foundational idea. (Dates of events or years of the lives of the referenced figures and thinkers are given in bold type.)

Around 2500 BC. Sumerians create history's first written laws.

1792-1750 BC. The ruler of Babylon, Hammurabi, substantially reworks Sumerian laws and compiles them in a code of 282 articles, some relating to issues of ethics. For example, the code prescribes taking "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" [3, p. 86], with fear of retaliation intended to deter wrongdoing. Subsequently, borrowing religious and ethical principles of this kind from one another, different peoples interpret them differently; norms expressed so concretely thus cannot be considered absolute (although they may strike us as "eternal").

1375-1358 BC. Pharaoh Amenhotep IV (Akhenaten) attempts to establish a kind of monotheistic religion in Egypt - a cult of the solar disk (Aten). The religion proclaims the equality of all peoples before a single God.

1312 BC. (According to the chronology accepted in the Torah). During the exodus from Egypt, the Jews obtain the laws of Moses, which come to have a tremendous impact in human history. "The Torah was a bold leap into the future. It represents an enormous step beyond everything that existed at the time. <...> The Code of Moses far surpasses all previous laws in its comprehensive humanism, thirst for justice, striving for democracy" [4, pp. 54, 55]. Incredibly, all of the following centuries have added relatively little to the ethics expressed in the Ten Commandments. It might seem the call of Moses was heard: "You shall not add to what I command you nor subtract from it." [5, Deuteronomy 4:2].

With this, the earliest stage of the development of human morality draws to a close, followed by a centuries-long pause.

Around 580-500 BC. The ancient Greek philosopher and mathematician Pythagoras of Samos creates an ethical doctrine that treats moral life as founded on enlightened consciousness, harmony, and a sense of measure in emotions and actions. Pythagoras believes a human being should engage in self-cultivation of chastity, moderation, generosity of spirit and respect for others' opinions. His ideas have a major impact on the subsequent development of ancient philosophy.

563-483 BC. The founder of Buddhism, Nepalese prince Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha Shakyamuni), holds the chief principles of morality to be spiritual perfection, rejection of extremes in behavior (the search for the "middle path") and self-restraint. Addressed to all human beings, the "simplified" Buddhist moral code contains only five principles (Panch Shila), including some similarities to the commandments of Moses. Proclaiming love for all things, Hinduism and Buddhism anticipate the concept of a cosmic ethics: "One who attains perfection makes no distinction between the soul and the natural world, between oneself and another" (from the Hindu legend "Vamana Purana"). In the following centuries, Buddhism spreads throughout all the countries of South and East Asia, evolving into a unique type of "religion without God."

551-479 BC. The ancient Chinese thinker Confucius proclaims earthly existence as the highest value, and humaneness, generosity, enlightenment and adherence to certain rules (etiquette) as the fundamental virtues. Confucius asserts that the public good and the state's prosperity depend directly on the moral qualities of its ruler: "Each of us, from emperor to commoner, above all must busy ourselves with moral self-perfection, taking this to be the source of good for all things." Thus concurrently with the work of Pythagorus and Buddha an effort is undertaken to "construct an autonomous morality without ties to either religion or revelation" [6, p. 71].

480-400 BC. The Chinese scholar Mo-ti (Mo Di) calls for "seeing others the same way you see yourself"; in his view, the "love of all for all" will lead humanity to "unite as an alternative to disunion," for "mutual benefit" and universal order, helping to defeat "mutual hatred," which he sees as the cause of all the ills of mankind [7, pp. 52, 53].

469-399 BC. The ancient Greek philosopher Socrates proposes an idea, new for antique civilization, of the universality and aboluteness of moral laws. Contrary to all religions, he does not see God as the only source of morality, but conjectures that morality is also created by human beings, and that faith must be controlled by reason, which serves as the measure of morality. In his view, the public usefulness of a person's actions ranks among the most significant moral criteria. Socrates addresses his fellow citizens as an advocate of qualities such as temperance, frugality, honesty and striving for knowledge.

428-347 BC. Plato, Socrates' pupil, posits every human life's calling to strive for the singular and eternal idea of the Good, glimpsed with the "mental vision" of the immortal soul. Like Confucius, he believes that society's condition depends on humans' moral qualities, and hopes that progress in morality will lead to the creation of an ideal state. He believes it is better to experience injustice than to inflict it on others, that in "working for others' happiness, we find our own" and that the "one who loves is more divine than the beloved" — moral principles, expressed by Plato, which prepared the antique world for the reception of Christianity.

384-322 BC. The foremost scholar of antiquity, Aristotle, asserts that, having created human reason, God no longer intervenes in human lives. Obeying his own natural social instinct and reason, striving for perfection, a human being begins to understand that only the common good can bring him true happiness, that unjust treatment of others lies at the root of all evils. The main objectives of education, according to Aristotle, involve refining skills for life as a social being and cultivating love of others.

So in just two centuries, in the vast expanse from China to Greece, representatives of completely different cultures achieved an amazing breakthrough in ethics, discovering similar moral principles which would serve as a basis for the later development of ethical thought.

First century AD. The spread of Christianity begins in the eastern part of the Roman Empire. According to the prominent Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev, "if we take the teachings of Christ and reject Christ himself, it becomes impossible to find anything absolutely new and original in Christianity. In the Old Testament, in India, with Socrates and the Stoics, nearly all the elements of Christian morals had already been given." [8, p. 150]. Christianity's most significant moral norm was also not new: "...The whole law is fulfilled in one statement, namely, 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself." [9; Epistle to the Galatians, 5:14] — it suffices to compare this commandment with the far more ancient covenant of the Torah: "You shall not bear hatred against your brother in your heart ... Take no revenge and cherish no grudge against your fellow countrymen. You shall love your neighbor as yourself." [5; Leviticus 19:17,18]. But namely early Christianity gave primary emphasis to the universal precepts of charity, love and freedom, and Christianity caused these commandments to become familiar to many peoples throughout Asia and Europe (and later on other continents). As Berdyaev observed, "before Christ, the world knew no universal religion; all religions were national and limited" [8, p. 149]. Christianity, according to Vladimir Solovyov, "placed an absolute ideal before man and gave him a conclusive task for his own work" (cited in [10, p. 75]).

However, a wide gulf may separate ethics as preached and ethics as practiced in life. The devastating Crusades, the relentless religious wars, the horrors of the Inquisition were all accomplished by religious fanatics in the name of God, but contrary to His commandments: "Two basic tenets of Christianity — equality and forgiveness of injuries — were rejected by its followers and spiritual guides." [11, p. 111]

In the 7th century, alongside the darkness of medieval Europe, a brilliant Islamic civilization arises. Although accompanied by a flowering of science and art, this civilization produces no notable discoveries in the field of human morals. Only the European Renaissance manages to provide the impetus for morals' further development.

1564-1616. The works of the great English playwright William Shakespeare become a kind of artistic Encyclopedia of Ethics, able to express the whole of man's awareness of good and evil. Shakespeare and other geniuses of the late Renaisaance help people understand the moral values that become the basis of Western civilization.

1724-1804. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant formulates the concept of moral duty and universal morals — the so-called categorical imperative: "If everyone were to act in such a way that their behavior would coincide with the universal aim of humanity, this would represent the attainment of the highest perfection." [12, p. 321] Critiquing Kant, many philosophers have pointed out his inability to specify how to define this "universal aim of humanity" and the question of "why we should submit to his categorical imperative, unless it represents an expression of the will of the Supreme Being." [11, p. 50]

1748-1832. The founder of utilitarianism, English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, maintains that "useful action" represents the primary element in morals. He theorizes that the reasonable satisfaction of private interests (egoism) ultimately leads to altruism and to the achievement of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

1798-1857. The founder of positivism, French philosopher Auguste Comte, argues that the force of reason will ultimately cause human beings to recognize that their personal lives depend greatly on how the world is ordered. Comte even proposes the replacement of "outdated" Christianity with a new religion taking humanity to represent the supreme divinity.

1806-1873. English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill, working to develop the idea of utilitarianism, maintains that, in adjusting to new ethical principles, society must maximize the freedom of its members, limiting this freedom only so that the actions of some cause no harm to others and serve common interests. Critics of utilitarianism have noted that the definition of "common interests" poses an enormously difficult task and that the "ethics of sociological utilitarianism arm furnish man with highly relative norms, subject to the influence of time and social conditions." [1, p. 173]; moreover, such an ethics fails to account for all the problems of individual, personal human morals.

1875-1965. German-born philosopher and humanist Albert Schweitzer (Nobel Peace Prize, 1952) follows the French philosopher Jean-Marie Guillot (1854-1888), developing the concept of an ethics of "reverence for life": "If indeed there is a basic moral principle, it must deal with man's relationship to life itself in all its manifestations. <...> Ethics is a limitless responsibility for all living things. <...> Only the absolute and universal desirability of preserving and developing life may be seen as moral, and this forms the focus for the ethics of reverence for life" [1, p. 148, 218, 226].

19th and 20th centuries. Classic — and especially Russian — literature explores a sweeping range of moral conflicts in human life: "Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Stendhal, Proust offer much more for understanding human nature than academic philosophers and scientists, than psychologists and sociologists," maintained Berdyaev [13, pp. 57].

Is it possible to understand human beings more deeply? Are human beings capable of discovering anything new in ethics? Or is the development of ethics already complete — much as, for example, Euclidean geometry and classical mechanics? Will humanity return to the simple commandments of the ancient prophets, or will it expect new revelations? Perhaps the 21st century will provide answers to these questions.

3. The origin of ethics and the possibility of the existence of absolute morals

How and when did the concepts of good and evil appear? Can certain moral principles be considered absolute? Seeking to approach these questions, we will begin by examining the religious point of view, making use of the Torah [5]. In the Book of Genesis, the description of each act of the Creation before the creation of man is followed by a repetition (five times!) of the words, "And God saw that it was good" (1:10-25). If the Creator gave the results of His actions a kind of evaluation, it follows that the ability to distinguish right from wrong originally belonged to Him, and not to human beings. Humans obtained this quality only as a result of the Fall, when they ate of the "Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil": "The serpent said to the woman: '... God knows well that the moment you eat of it your eyes will be opened and you will be like God, knowing what is good and what is evil' (emphasis added - AM). <...> Then the Lord God said: 'See! The man has become like one of Us, knowing what is good and what is evil." (3:4,5; 22).

This links morals with a Divine origin. While polytheism may make peace with relativistic morals, given that these morals may derive from a variety of gods, no monotheistic religion views its moral laws as temporary or dependent on circumstances.

According to the scientific or, more accurately, materialistic point of view, moral criteria arise as a result of the development of social consciousness. Human beings have never lived alone, and even a primitive community needed to regulate the behavior of its members (a need much the same as that of herds of animals, which, according to Darwin, possess a "social instinct"). Thus certain notions of good and evil have always been inherent in human beings. Berdyaev gives an example, somewhat ironically, of an early stage of morals — logical in their own way, albeit very limited: "A hottentot...asked what is good and what is evil, anwered, 'Good is when I steal someone else's wife, and evil is when someone steals my wife' ... < ... > The hottentot — who, in essence, exists among us as well — was a moralist" [13, p. 33]. (Of course, "hottentot" figures here only provisionally.) The problem of morals, therefore, lies not only in defining good and evil, but also in how broadly we are prepared to apply these concepts. Primitive "hottentot" ethics, bounded by the cave housing the clan, could not stay relevant in a setting of developing relations of production, which required more complex moral norms and a broadening of their scope. This led to the gradual emergence of the specific private ethics of various tribe and religions, then of classes, nations and entire civilizations. Because of the uneven development of productive forces and a certain inertia of the superstructure (to make use of these Marxist terms), all kinds of private ethics now co-exist on the earth.

We thus see that as humanity has developed, the scope of the application of ethical codes has steadily expanded, including an ever greater number of social groups — from clans to nations. It is logical to assume that this process will continue in the future, as a movement toward the establishment of planetary ethics. (Ethics could only become broader by extending to space, the cosmos, and perhaps such ethics will be developed when humanity has a need for this.) Even the world wars of the 20th century failed to disrupt the general tendency of ethical expansion: we are witnesses to the formation of a kind of universal morals — what are commonly called universal human values. If such morals are accepted by an overwhelming majority of human beings, who acknowledge these morals' supremacy over private ethics, then these morals become in essence absolute. One hopes these morals will prove truly humanistic (we will discuss their possible content below).

Thus both religious and materialist attitudes lead us to contemplate the possible existence of universal, absolute morals. The first approach assumes these morals are known to God and relayed through Him to human beings, while the second holds that humanity is capable of arriving at these morals autonomously in the course of its historical development. And, finally, another point of view is possible: seeing absolute morals as resulting from the joint creative work of God and man.

While our discussion here has concerned only whether absolute morals are possible, the issue also arises of their objective necessity for humanity (a topic to be discussed in this paper's final section).

4. The essence of absolute morals

To begin with, we should identify qualities that morals must possess to fulfill the role of the absolute. The chief among these is unconditionality. Absolute morals do not depend on external circumstances — their application should not be subject to any conditions of place or time. Another important trait of absolute morals is universality. These morals are addressed to all people without exception, because any selective application of moral norms ultimately yield various private ethics — that is, essentially, types of "hottentot morals." Another trait is supreme precedence. We must acknowledge the preeminence of absolute morals over all other group, party, corporate, national and religious moral norms — much as, for example, international law is conceded to take precedence over the legislation of individual states. Furthermore, absolute morals imply reciprocity: whatever, based on these morals, a person may demand of others, he must demand of himself. And finally, an important trait of absolute morals lies in their universality. The principle of absolute morals should effectively encompass all generally acknowledged human moral norms which regulate a person's specific actions (that is, any such norm furnishes only an individual instance of the comprehensive principle.

Let's try to formulate a creed of absolute morality in line with the above criteria. Perhaps this can be achieved by synthesizing certain indisputable moral principles long known to man - in fact, Albert Schweitzer believed that "the true fundamental principle of morality in all its universality must be somehow astoundingly elementary..." [1, pp. 105].

There is a legend according to which Confucius, asked by a student whether all of life could be governed by one word, answered: "That word is reciprocity. Do not do to others what you would not want done to yourself" [7, p.36]. A similar saying is associated with the Jewish sage Hillel (70 BC-10 AD; when a certain pagan asked Hillel to expound the basic meaning of the Torah in as much time as he was able to stand on one leg, the sage answered, "Do not do to others what is hateful to you - this is the whole Torah. The rest is commentary" [4, pp. 57].

This formula leaves undisclosed exactly what a person should not do, exactly what to see as evil in various circumstances — this must be the subject of various religious and ethical codes. (Recall that eight of the ten commandents of the Decalogue represent specific prohibitions.) And yet here we have an extremely generalized principle of rejecting evil: it is assumed that a person does not wish evil upon himself and that, guided by this formula, he will do no harm to another person.

The principle of rejecting evil is a necessary component of absolute morals, but is insufficient in that it requires no positive actions leading to good. Following only this principle, it is logically possible to arrive at the idea of it being better to do nothing at all. (This idea figures, for instance, in Buddhist teachings about nirvana - a state of the highest spiritual bliss, attained as a result of absolute calm.) In real life, however, the desire to avoid taking action may be dictated by egoism, and very often inaction proves a source of evil. Moreover, with inaction, development ends.

Let us now consider another rule, expressed in the words of the Gospel: "...Do to others as you would have them do to you. This is the Law and the prophets." [9; Matt. 7:12] (the final words apparently refer to the Torah). This formula also gives no specific course of action, but essentially represents a principle of affirming the good: it is assumed that a man wishes only good for himself and will act (that is, do) only for the shared good of others. Here, we already have the most general possible program of positive actions.

At first glance, this principle seems comprehensive, and seems to include the principle of negation of evil: indeed, if a person acts in such a way as to do others only good (which he wishes for himself), it follows from this that he will never do them harm. Another important factor applies here, however, which stands in the way of seeing the principle of the affirmation of good as sufficient in itself. The trouble is that, if consistently governed only by this principle, we can no longer resist evil and must unconditionally love everyone, including enemies (given that we obviously love ourselves). This is part of the call of the Gospel: "...offer no resistance to one who is evil. <...> ...love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you and pray for those who persecute you..." [9; Matt. 5:39,44]. A wish for friendship with enemies can also be found in the Quran: "...And so, the one with whom you had enmity will become as though he were a close friend" [14; 41:34]. Such commandments, are contrary to human nature and real life. (Here we might recall the American writer Edgar Howe's ironic remark, "Instead of loving your enemies, treat your friends a little better.") As Andre Maurois said, "There is a kind of charm in not resisting evil with violence, but it plays into the hands of scoundrels." We well understand that resisting evil in fact serves as one source of good. Consequently, the principle of affirming the good cannot in itself be considered absolute.

It seems reasonable to acknowledge that only a certain logical unity of the two above principles can form a consistent moral creed. Such a creed might be expressed in the words of the ancient Indian epic "Mahabharata," written around 300 BC: "Treat others as you would like them to treat you" (cited in [11, p. 239). The verb "treat" here means both not-doing (evil) and doing (good) — thus reuniting the two indivisible sides of the single medal of ethics and resolving the contradictions of each of the two separate principles. This formula gives a principle of reciprocal fairness: if a person doesn't want to be done evil that he doesn't deserve, or to be deprived of good that he does deserve, then in "treating" other people, he should behave accordingly. This principle may convey the essence of absolute morals, as indeed containing all the qualities of such morals named above — unconditionality, broadness, supreme precedence, reciprocity, universality.

One thing, however, must be added. The principle of reciprocal fairness supposes that the criterion for a person's relationship to others will come from his own idea of what is good or bad for himself. Thus man essentially becomes the "measure of all things," to use the expression of Protagoras. However, the scope of ethics may go beyond the bounds of "oneself": after all, human inclinations include self-denial and self-sacrifice, and people often wish good for others more than for themselves. True morality is highly irrational.

In search of an additional dimension for absolute morals, we might ask ourselves: what truly embodies the immutable and universal law of nature or God, and what is the aim of the part of nature's or God's "activity" which is visible to us? Contemporary ethics suggest only one answer - the development, support and expansion of life and its highest attribute, intelligence. Our duty, therefore, lies in facilitating this development to the greatest possible degree — after all, without life, without man, the very posing of ethical questions becomes meaningless. "Ethics, according to Guyau, should consist of instruction in the means that lend themselves to the attainment of the goal set by nature itself — the growth and development of life" [11, p. 248]. And this is how Albert Schweitzer understood the problem of absolute ethics: "Nearly everything seen as good in the usual moral evaluation of man's relationship to man can be summed up as relating to material and spiritual preservation of human life and to the aspiration to endow it with the highest possible value. Conversely, anything in human relationships that is seen as bad can ultimately be summed up as relating to the material or spiritual destruction or inhibition of human life, and also to a lack of aspiration to endow it with the highest possible value. < ... > We must meticulously measure all principles, convictions and ideals that arise in society with the measure of the absolute ethics of reverence for life" [1, p. 218]. The very idea of absolute morals obviously presupposes an absolutely unlimited scope for their application: "Love for all creatures in general, love of animals, plants, minerals, the earth, the stars, has remained completely unexplored in Christian ethics. This is a problem for cosmic ethics, and one which needs recognition," said Berdyaev [13, p. 166]. (Such an approach is found, for example, in Buddhism, with its call not to harm not only people, but generally all living things and even inanimate nature.)

The quintessence of all these statements is a principle of support for life expressed by Schweitzer: "Good is whatever serves the preservation and development of life, and evil is whatever destroys life and hinders it" [1, p. 218] This principle is not in itself absolute, of course, because a person must "decide for himself, in each instance, to what extent he can remain ethical, to what extent he can comply with the need to destroy or cause harm to life, and to what degree, consequently, he himself can bear the blame for all this" (ibid, p. 222). Nevertheless, the principle of support for life perfectly complements the principle of reciprocal fairness, establishing a measure for good and evil which, while relative, also manages to be universal and to transcend the limits of "myself."

Another guidepost in the contemporary sense of absolute good and evil could be the definition given by the Russian historian Andrei Nikitin: "...'Good' and 'evil' ...initially, perhaps, gain their significance as timeless, absolute categories as they find affirmation in the teachings of great religions. <...> What is 'good' turns out to be all that connects people, that allows each person to work with the greatest impact and devotion — love of kin, friendship and assistance of others, peace and harmony on Earth. Conversely, absolute 'evil' is everything which stands in opposition to the aforementioned, which divides people, which impedes spiritual harmony among human beings, which destroys the common cultural values created by preceding generations..." [15, p. 26, 27]

5. On moral maximalism

Moral maximalism — that is, the desire by all means necessary to adhere strictly to a given set of moral norms — may be internal, when a person subjects himself to elevated moral demands, or external, when others are subjected to such demands. Speaking in particular about Christian morality, Berdyaev remarks, "There are two forms of moral pathos: one predominantly demands high morality from oneself and one's companions in life, while the other predominantly exposes the faults of outsiders. The second pathos is not Christian" [13, p. 106].

A beneficial internal maximalism informs, for example, the following words of the Talmud: "Be unforgiving toward yourself, and you will easily forgive others." Certainly, mercilessness toward oneself is not easy, but it can be hoped that such rigorous standards may work for others' benefit.

External moral maximalism has quite different effects — it may lead to repellent extremism (much as, for instance, the fanatics of medieval times sought to justify their merciless actions as manifestations of high religious standards). Such maximalism tends to go hand in hand with bigotry and hypocricy. "The greatest pigs usually demand that people be angels," as Julian Tuwim observed.

It should be noted that moral norms dictated by extreme (although logical for this type of ethics) maximalism may prove difficult or unrealistic to put into practice. For instance, followers of Jainism — a religion professed by about 8 million believers in India — tend to regard any physical movement by a human being as sinful, given its potential to cause to damage to a plant, insect or any other part of nature. Moral maximalism also appears in certain impassioned appeals in the Gospel, which are practically impossible to follow in everyday life. Here is a characteristic example: "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall not commit adultery.' But I say to you, everyone who looks at a woman with lust has already commited adultery with her in his heart. If your right eye causes you to sin, tear it out and throw it away... And if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it away..." [9, Matt. 5:27-30].

Some may say that these words should not be taken literally, that they should be regarded only as a kind of lofty appeal to an ideal perfection. But with such an obvious gap between the realities of everyday life and the demands of the moral code, does there not arise the harmful thought of the impossibility of keeping to any moral norms at all? The extremity of certain moral mandates may force sincere believers to shield themselves from the world, to seek isolation, to withdraw into monasteries. But it's doubtful that this makes the world any better. Knowing this, reasonable spiritual leaders, who follow the spirit and not the letter of their religious laws, have discouraged moral maximalism.

Extreme moral norms come into conflict with human nature, contradicting the principles of universality and reciprocity that are integral to truly humane absolute morals.

6. Can distinct moral norms be absolute?

No code of ethics is free of internal contradictions. Aspiring to follow a specific code of morals sometimes leads to a moral impasse, with any given norm potentially contradicting another one, no less important. Blindly implementing some moral code's principle can sometimes be far simpler than carrying the burden of moral accountability for one's own choices. "And here it is important to establish that no law, no standard can possibly help to settle encounters with moral conflict. A human being is granted tremendous freedom in resolving the moral conflicts that in fact give rise to the tragedy of life," said Berdyaev [13, p. 139]. In addition to ethical standards, people are given reason and conscience, the right and obligation to choose their actions.

Sometimes good intentions lead to demands for an unconditional compliance with all the requirements, without exception, of a given code of ethics, with every single commandment and even every word it contains declared sacred and absolute: "Cursed be he who fails to keep and to fulfill the whole of the Torah" [5, Deut., 27:26], or: "...whoever breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do so will be called least in the kingdom of heaven..." [9; Matt. 5:19].

If an orthodox religious person wishes complete compliance with these requirements, he obviously creates a contradiction not only with the spirit of his religion, but with the laws of any civilized nation. Is it possible, for example, to punish with death for apostasy from any idea, even the most exalted — the idea of God (a demand found in the Torah) or, for instance, the idea of a "bright Communist future"? And is it possible to justify a harsh punishment by pointing to "the demands of the time"? "Humanism consists of the fact that a human being should never be sacrificed for any purpose" [1, p. 208] — perhaps the lessons of the 20th century are enough for humanity at last to realize this simple truth?

In fact, deep religiosity and true morality (in the spirit of absolute morals) hardly require the elevation of individual commandments into an absolute. One illustration: the tenet, seen by some as fundamental to Judaism, that there is no such thing as a rule without exceptions.

Seeking to treat any specific moral standards as absolutes is not only ridiculous, but extremely harmful and potentially a source of great evil. Thus Islamic fundamentalists justify their actions with quotations picked from the Quran, ignoring that "compared with the small, but frequently quoted, number of verses in the Quran calling for jihad against infidels, the Quran contains far more appeals for justice, mercy and compassion" [16, p. 53]. Unscrupulous or limited people with a penchant for fanaticism are also able to turn any commandment, any moral standard into dogma.

Fanaticism was defined with amazing incisiveness and relevance for our day by Berdyaev in his time: "A fanatic is a person unable to accommodate more than one thought, who sees everything in a straight line and never turns his head to see the full complexity and diversity of God's world. The fanatic does not see people and has no interest in human beings, but sees solely the idea and shows interest solely in the idea. <...> All ideas carry the potential to become a source of fanatical madness — the idea of God, the idea of moral perfection, the idea of justice, the idea of love, liberty, science... Any value, if turned into an idol, becomes a lie and untruth." [13, p. 152, 153]. Berdyaev later continues, "Fanaticism must never be tolerated. It is essential to fight for spiritual liberation in thought, in the state, in the family, in everyday life. This is an ethical requirement...." (p. 154).

Absolute morals do not demand that a person always follow every moral standard. None of these standards in itself, if it concerns specific prohibitions or permissions, should be considered absolute, and none ranks as unconditional or possesses ultimate precedence. Take, for example, the non-absolute commandment "Thou shalt not kill" [5; Ex. 20:13], [9; Matt. 5:21], [14; 17:35] — it sometimes must be violated to defend one's own life or others' (which is fully consistent with the principle of absolute morals). The status of absolute belongs only to the generalized moral principle, which makes no attempt to regulate specific actions (much as the principle of reciprocal fairness considered above).

7. Where does the absolutization of group morality lead?

The ethics of social groups — classes, nations, religions — are not always in themselves a source of evil; rather, evil arises when group moral values are proclaimed absolute and singularly true, when they are imposed on people by force,when group ethics serve to justify the morality of an immoral attitude toward representatives of other groups. Revolutions and wars have always been accompanied by a fierce confrontation between private ethics — witness the Arab-Muslim conquest, the Christian crusades, religious wars between Catholics and Protestants, the expansion of the Ottoman Empire and the Russian empire, colonial conquest, the aggression of the fascist powers, the Cold War. No matter what the economic, political or other reasons for the conflicts that have torn the world, the warring parties have always hidden their true causes for ethical reasons. At the same time, each side's own moral standard was proclaimed perfect, righteous, holy, while the enemies took on the appearance of moral monsters (the legendary knightly attitude toward the enemy has always been a rare exception).

A typical example of aggressive group ethics can be found in class "proletarian morality", which its adherents set in opposition not only to "outdated" church morality and "rotten" bourgeois morality, but to the entire ethical heritage of the past. Speaking of Karl Marx, Berdyaev notes: "...He also declared war on humanistic morality: he preaches cruelty to man and to kin for the sake of the non-human, superhuman kingdom of collectivism" [17, p. 189]. The Bolsheviks unwaveringly called moral any action they believed could contribute to the victory of the proletariat (a very convenient excuse to justify all sorts of lawlessness): "We declare that our morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat... We do not believe in eternal and absolute morality... We reject any morality that does not proceed from man (but from God, for example) and that lacks of class content," declared Lenin, speaking at the Third Congress of the Komsomol (October 2, 1920).

During World War II, the Communists nevertheless had to remember God and, reluctantly, to make peace with some of the religious and national moral values they had earlier openly derided. Still later, apparently wary of the moral vacuum appearing in society, the party concocted a pretentious "moral code of a builder of communism." However, within a short while, this code ceased to be recalled except in jokes. The attempt to create a special "morality of the working class" ended in failure.

Much as class morals, national morals also often stand in contrast to universal ethics. Speaking of the absolutization of national morals, Berdyaev said, "...For the nation's sake everything is allowed, in its name it's permissible to commit crimes, from a human point of view. The morals of nations have no wish to know humaneness" [18, p. 137] And again, "It is deplorable when nationality, with boundless conceit and selfish self-assertion, imagines itself to represent a universe and refuses to allow anyone or anything beside it" [19, p. 105]. German Nazis began with an assertion of the absolute moral superiority of the "pure Aryan race" over other peoples, whom they proclaimed "subhumans," carriers of low-grade morals. We know what resulted from these "ethical" considerations soon after — the physical annihilation of millions of people. As we have seen, from the absolutization of national morals to the perpetration of cannibalistic crimes against humanity is only one step.

Inhumanity can also result from raising religious morals to an absolute status. In this way, the activities of the Holy Inquisition in the Middle Ages were dictated, of course, by concern for the purity of Christian ethics. In the same way, today's Islamic fundamentalists set the "true values" of their religion in opposition to the declining, in their opinion, morals of the West. Aggressive proponents of religious morals often refer to their sacred books, finding they provide the very moral dogmas they need for each occasion. "The sacred books of the Christians and Muslims may provide justification for any political aspirations" [3, p. 157].

We see again and again that what begins with the absolutism of group ethics, set in contrast to a broadly conceived human morality, usually ends in great bloodshed.

Proponents of xenophobic private ethics readily make reference to the scholarly works of economists and philosophers, to national or religious traditions, to laws (which may be inhumane), to military regulation, to anything at all — whatever removes accountability from themselves as individuals and shifts it to their ideological peers. In this way, Bolshevism, remarked A.N. Yakovlev, "contributed greatly to the collectivization of conscience." This "collectivization" fundamentally runs counter to absolute morals. Conscience cannot be the trait of a party, corporation, class, nation — or, more generally, of any group or collective.

Absolute morals, following the principles of universality and reciprocity, opposes any xenophobic private ethics that posits varying criteria of good and evil based on the groups of people they apply to. Small wonder the adherents of such views — the Bolsheviks and Nazis, the chauvinists and religious fundamentalists — denounce "abstract humanism." Not only do they not believe in the possibility of uniting people around shared human values, they fear such a union as leaving no room for group ethics promoted as an absolute.

8. Is it possible to integrate religions?

Religion continues to play an important role in people's lives. As of 2000, based on data from that year [20, p. 684], 87% of people see themselves as professing various religions. The degree of their religiosity, of course, may range from accepting only the idea of God to meticulously performing specific rites. In any case, though, religious morals significantly influence human behavior, and this influence may be unconscious. "Sometimes beneath a crust of theoretical disbelief secretly lives true, deep religiosity; and conversely, actively demonstrated ecclesiastical piety may conceal an utterly unspiritual soul," observed the Russian philosopher I.A. Ilin (cited in [7, p. 624]).

There are many denominations, but about 80% of believers belong to only five religions: the world's Christians number about 2 billion (33.8% of all believers), while Muslims number about 1.2 billion (20.1%), Hindus 811 million (13.7%), followers of Taoism — Chinese traditional beliefs, based on the teachings of Lao Tzu — 385 million (6.5%) and Buddhists 360 million (6.1%) [20, p.684]. The less numerous followers of very ancient religions such as Judaism (14.4 million) also continue to influence humanity's spiritual life. Obviously, the planet's future depends in many ways on people's attitudes toward religion — their own and others'. There are two possible approaches. The first assumes that only one religion is true and pleasing to God — one's own — viewing all others as heretical and false; the second considers all religions (except, of course, fanatical beliefs) equal before the one God and perceives that in essence, as Bernard Shaw observed, "There is only one religion, though there are a hundred versions of it."

The first point of view seems impossible to justify logically. A person usually tends to favor a particular religion simply on account of upbringing, family traditions and being used to certain rites — faith, like parents, is sooner not a matter of choice. (Although there are certainly exceptions: one can come to a particular religion quite consciously — sometimes as a result of spiritual seeking and sometimes to acquire various practical benefits.) Thus a specific person generally belongs to one or another religion not at all because of its unique truth. Some religions have existed for thousands of years, others for many centuries, and billions of people live as their followers — how can it be argued that only one of these beliefs is true? Even within the same religion there are generally conflicting reformist trends, interpretations, sects, heresies. "...Behind the very real strife that can arise between representatives of holy orders lies not the will of God, but the entirely earthly interests of particular people... What one blesses, the other curses — in the name of one and the same God" [21] And this strife has always harmfully impacted human lives and morals.

If, despite the significant differences in religious practices, we take the second view — that is, recognize the profound unity of all religions — we might conjecture the possibility of the emergence of some universal, cosmopolitan religion, which, ending sectarian strife, would help to unify people.. Since ancient times, many prophets and thinkers have had this dream. Even in times of violent religious conflict, Pierre Abelard (1079-1142) and Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) preached tolerance and unity of religions, believing that every religion contains a grain of truth. In a later period, this was acknowledged by Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and the Indian philosopher Ramakrishna (1836-1886). The latter said of his religious experience: "I professed all religions, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and I followed the path of the various sects of Judaism. And I found that they all have different roads to approach the same God..." (cited in [7, p. 468]).

Also interesting is the evolution of the views of Leo Tolstoy, which P.A. Kropotkin describes as follows: "...As Tolstoy studied the systems of various religions' founders, as well as of philosophers who had dealt with the problems of morality, he sought to define and establish the elements of a universal religion able to unite all people..." [22, p. 330]. And our contemporary offers these additional views: "...Perhaps the differences between East and West will blur and a new universal vision of peace will emerge. It may be secular, non-religious, since modern rationalism, regardless of any retreats, continues to forge a path for itself... But on the other hand, there is the possible emergence of a non-traditional, cosmopolitan religion..." [3, p. 159]

How might humankind arrive at a common religion? Could it come to pass that at some point in the future, sooner or later, one of the long-established religions will triumph, absorbing most of the others, dissolving them in itself? The major German philosopher of our time, Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), responded to this question in the negative: he held that traditional religions cannot lead to a belief common for all of humanity — all too often, they form a source of contention [7, p. 638]. It's hard to imagine one of the traditional religions, even the most "correct" one, successfully unifying the world's peoples, as ancient prophets poetically foretold. Historical experience shows that a mass voluntary change of faith, a rejection of tradition, is an extremely difficult, almost impossible matter. Small wonder that new religions have been implanted most often with "fire and sword." And can any religion aspire to have billions of people become its proselytes, voluntarily renouncing the faith of their fathers?

Accordingly, no real case has yet been made for the absorption of all religions by some single one of them. A different matter, however, is to envision religions coming closer together in a such a way that none of them must disappear from the face of the earth, sacrificing itself for other faiths. History contains examples of long, fruitful interrelationships among different religions. For some time in Medina there was a single religious community which accepted Jews and Christians, who retained their customs alongside Muslims. These tendencies manifested themselves in the era of the Umayyad rule (661-750), when the vast territories conquered by the Arabs saw tolerance observed toward representatives of other monotheistic religions [23, p. 199, 202]. An atmosphere of religious tolerance also prevailed in the Spain of the tenth through twelth centuries, which saw, under the aegis of Islam, the advent of a "golden age" of Jewish culture, while Christianity coexisted with a revival in the spirit of antiquity. However, the periods of peaceful cooperation gave way to religious persecution and brutal wars with "infidels." Islam (like Christianity) did not make use of these historical chances to bring world religions closer together.

The United States provides a vivid example of religious tolerance, with a multitude of denominations existing separately from the state and peacefully coexisting. Religious tolerance has been a major American tradition since colonial times, when in 1649 Cecilius Calvert, the second Lord Baltimore, published his famous "Act Concerning Religion." In some colonies, true, there were restrictions on atheists, Catholics, Jews, holding official posts, but these measures were temporary and did not express a general trend [24, pp. 36, 46, 146]. Individual cases of religious excess (such as the witch-hunt in Salem in the 1680s) concerned, as a rule, members of the community itself, rather than the faith of outsiders. In general, America can be proud of its unprecedented 350-year history of inter-denominational peace and cooperation.

In our lifetimes, despite the resistance of fundamentalists, religious confrontation is gradually giving way as the representatives of different religions find common ground regarding the core issues of human life. This trend has been particularly evident in the work of such prominent religious figures as Pope John Paul II (Wojtyla) and the Tibetan Dalai Lama XIV (Tenzin Dzhiattso). In autumn 1999 at the Vatican, worshipers from 20 world religions called on world leaders to work collaboratively to solve human problems and prohibit the use of religious sentiments in fanning hatred.

We now consider the specific grounds for a deeper communication, and in the future, perhaps, for the integration of religions. Above all, there is the idea of the one God. It must be assumed that humanity as a whole has gone far beyond its youth of naïve conceptions of a multiplicity of gods competing with each other like mere mortals. Another important prerequisite for the integration of religions is the unity of humankind, the natural equality of human beings and the profound commonality of their religious quests: "We may rightfully speak of a unity of religions. It relates to the unity of human nature, and to the kinship of experiences evoked by a sense of the Supreme Being and by the thought of Him," concluded Alexander Men [6, p. 13]. There is also an important historical unity in the prophets and holy books of Islam, Christianity and the most ancient of the monotheistic religions, Judaism: "...All the scriptures, including the Bible and the Koran, are chapters in the same divine book" [3, p. 159]. Finally, a common ethical foundation for all religions may be derived from the seven "universal laws of Noah." We find great significance in all these elements: they speak of religions' fundamental unity and spiritual kinship. Is it not amazing that, despite such deep commonalities, the faithful remain divided by the purely external, ritualistic aspects of religious practice — the ways people pray, the names they use for God, and how they imagine his image?

The possibility of the emergence of an integral faith based on such grounds is proved, for one, by our world having a religion such as the Baha'i Faith (Baha'ism), which is professed by 7.107 million people on all continents [20, p. 684]. The herald of this religion was Mirza Ali Mohammed (The Bab), born in 1819 in Shiraz (Persia). He founded a new branch of Islam, called Bábism. The reformer of Bábism, Mirza Hossein, known as Bahá'u'lláh (1817-1892) departed from orthodox Islam still further. He proposed to integrate all existing religions into one teaching (Baha'i), which recognizes the moral precepts of the ancient prophets, but rejects the excessive dogmatism of the old religions and the strict enforcement of their rites [25, pp. 156, 158]. According to the Baha'i, human morality is manifested not in prayers, rituals and religious ceremonies, and in all daily human activities. Baha'i temples (the largest are in Haifa and Chicago) are arranged symbolically: they have eight doors, facing all corners of the earth, as if to show openness to all the earth's people.

Considered in somewhat more detail, the principles of the Baha'i religion appear to represent a possible moral-religious basis for the consolidation of humanity [25, p. 158], [26]. The main principle is the unity and integrity of the entire human race, faith in the coming unification of the planet and the establishment of universal peace. (It is supposed that this will happen when people recognize the necessity for their unity.) "It is not for him who loves his country to be proud, but rather for him who loves the entire world. The Earth is but one country and mankind its citizens," declared Bahá'u'lláh [26]. The second important principle is the recognition of the common ethical foundation of all religions. From these two main principles of Baha'i follow the rest: 1) the equality of all persons before the law, along with provisions for their equal rights; 2) the use of a criterion of justice in solving social and economic problems, the elimination of extremes of poverty and wealth; 3) the promotion of conscientious labor as a form of pious deed; 4) the education of humankind and the fight against any kind of prejudice, the introduction of compulsory universal education and the encouragement, by every possible means, of human striving toward knowledge as one of the greatest gifts of God; 5) the harmony of religion and science, replacing blind faith with independent searching for truth, which should become the aim of human spiritual life; 6) refraining from violent anti-government activities; 7) the use of an authoritative international tribunal for resolving disputes between nations and states; 8) the adoption of a universal language.

Can any person, unless infected with the virus of chauvinism and religious fanaticism, deny the universality and humaneness of these principles? The Baha'i Faith may be faulted, if anything, for excessive optimism, and its unfeasible goals, somewhat reminiscent of Communist ideals, also carry traces of some Jewish and Christian influence. But are Jewish Messianic expectations or, for example, the Christian call to love our enemies more realistic? And are the goals proclaimed by socialists completely utopian and unattainable? — in fact, they have been implemented, at least in part, in many democratic countries. The Baha'i principles contain no inhumane measures, and — this seems to warrant special emphasis — these principles are fully consistent with the essence of absolute morals.

The integral faith which, it must be hoped, humankind will reach may differ somewhat from the Baha'i Faith, but as it is, this religion has established a significant precedent.

9. Can humankind reach absolute morals?

The whole course of history — the development of science, technology, culture — shows that despite human beings' natural deficiencies, the human striving for creativity and perfection has steadily increased. Could the progress of humanity have occurred without the element of ethics? Have morals improved since the distant times of the passionate appeal to ideal morality, "Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect" [9; Matt. 5:48]?

There is a belief that the true essence of man remains unchanged — thus thought, for example, Pyotr Florensky: "I see no change in peoples' essence, but only change in the outward forms of life. On the contrary. The man of the past, the distant past was more humane and refined than people of later times, and most importantly, incomparably more noble" (cited in [27, p. 101]). It is more logical, however, to venture that the tremendous collective spiritual experience of humanity and the enormous cultural values forged over centuries have nonethless contributed to human beings' positive moral development. A.L. Nikitin aptly noted the importance of accumulated knowledge: "Knowledge always obliges. We may no longer say that we do not know what we live for. We cannot say that we know nothing of our predecessors, whose insights have been stored in the archives of planetary human experience. We cannot say that no one ever told us the right way to live and what to do. All this has been spoken many times, in different languages and in different historical ages..." [15. p. 28]. And here is what certain Russian philosophers have said about progress in ethics. Leo Tolstoy: "Humanity is slowly, but without stopping, moving forward, that is, toward an ever clearer consciousness of the truth of its life's meaning and importance, and toward arranging life in accordance with this clarified consciousness" (quoted in [22, pp. 326] ). Nikolai Berdyaev: "In past centuries, people were often better. And yet, progress in moral consciousness does exist. Humanity is a new phenomenon... A person may have more moral crudity than in the less humane, more severe past, but will now be judged by a new consciousness" [28, p. 285].

This "new consciousness" is gradually becoming more moralistic. Ethical principles are gradually being introduced to the broadest possible spheres of human activity — even in those seemingly remote from morals, such as business. "I am convinced that without the adoption of ethical values, the market economy is doomed," said leading businessman Frederick Philips [29, p. 30]. Ethics enter into politics as well: "There is a widespread belief that morals and politics are two things that can never mix. However, farsightedness and wisdom can be expected only from honest and humane, that is, moral, politics. Fraud, deceit, provocation, cruelty can sometimes achieve short-term gains, but ultimately such politics are destined to fail" [30, p. 22]

The formation of a "global ethics" has never been painless; it has forged a path for itself through centuries of accumulated debris of xenophobia, painfully overcoming the inertia of class, ethnic and religious conflicts. A real turning point in the long road of developing "transnational morals" came with the Nuremberg Trial, the first trial in history to legally and morally condemn crimes against humanity, on behalf of many peoples. (Recall the above words of Berdyaev: "judged by a new consciousness.") And it was extremely important that, for ethical reasons, the country defeated in the war found the strength to acknowledge the justness of the court's sentence.

The world has indeed changed — one only need compare the past attitude of humanity toward the Armenian genocide of 1915 with the modern one toward the Holocaust of 1935-1945; the attitude toward Stalin's deportation of national minorities (which seemingly went unnoticed by the world at that time) and toward modern ethnic cleansing, or the response among democratic nations to the beginning of Fascist aggression in the '30s of the last century or to the present century's threat of Islamic extremism. "...The sense of moral indignation caused by all inhuman acts distinguishes our era from past centuries," said Alexander Men [6, p. 116]. Conflicting social forces can no longer ignore world opinion or universal moral values, which gradually are being acknowledged as a standard for the actions not only of individuals or limited social groups, but of entire nations. Perhaps there is no less evil in the world, but most people now react to evil differently than before.

Ethical principles have become the norm when they have begun to meet the internal needs of the majority of people in a given human community. In earlier times, this has happened within the boundaries of family, community, nation, state; at present, we are witnessing the formation of a planetary ethics. We see that humanity has an ever greater need for the affirmation of certain universal moral principles — at least in the role of an ideal, a compass by which people can check their course.

According to Vernadsky, the successful development of the noosphere requires two conditions: "man's domination of external nature and man's own domination, through the forces of reason, over the lower instincts" (cited in [7, p. 535]). Humanity today has almost satisfied the first condition, but we do not know how or when it can approach the point already dreamed of by Kant: "Supreme moral perfection is the universal goal of humanity" [12, p. 321].

The main role in the movement toward this goal will undoubtedly be played by study and education. This was emphasized by thinkers of the past, whose words remain valid today. "If you want to reform the world, first you must reform education" — so thought the great educator Janusz Korczak. Here are the words of Tolstoy, who vehemently protested against improper education (including religious education): "...Children are indoctrinated, namely indoctrinated with a religious teaching that is old, distorted, and in conflict with other teachings (emphasized by A.M.).... This applies to all the great religious teaching: to Brahmanism, Judaism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, Islam. What a terrible crime!" (cited in [21]). Indeed, criminal is the appropriate label for a secular or religious teacher who indoctrinates children with an idea of the superiority of their own nation or religion, or — this most of all — hatred of strangers or diverse creeds. In active opposition to this must be education in the spirit of planetary ethics.

In our lifetimes, we have seen quite powerful examples of processes working towards the planet's unification. (Many of these were predicted as far back as the '20s and '30s of the twentieth century by V.I. Vernadsky, Eduard Le Roy and Teilhard de Chardin, the creators of the theory of the noosphere.) Here are the primary components of these processes: 1) globalized economy and finance; 2) a planetary transport network developed to quickly move goods and people; 3) a global information network through which people may exchange knowledge and new ideas at rapid speeds; 4) broad dissemination of science, widespread introduction of new technologies and inventions, as well as international technical and trade standards; 5) an increased role of education, international student exchanges; 6) formation of transnational associations and communities with transparent internal borders, common currencies and integrated customs zones; 7) numerous global and regional councils and organizations emerging to serve as a prototype of a "world government" (UN, UNESCO, OSCE, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, Interpol and many others) — from 1985 to 1999, the number of such institutions increased by two-thirds, with their tasks growing increasingly complex [31, p. 66]; 8) a growing number of democratic states acknowledging international standards for human rights (in 20 years, the proportion of such states increased from less than one-third to one-half [ibid, p. 56]); 9) adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which serves as the basis for harmonizing national legislations and creating international legal bodies such as the Hague International Court of Justice; 10) effective international relief organized for victims of natural disasters and humanitarian catastrophes; 11) reconnaissance satellites used by the international community to identify hidden malicious actions by individual countries or criminal organizations; 12) cultural intermingling, the growing desire and ability of people to benefit from advances in art and literature among other nationalities as well as their own; 13) a trend toward convergence of religions (the activities of the World Council of Churches, Pope John Paul II and the Dalai Lama XIV, a growing interest in integrated religions); 14) increasing migration of labor forces and populations throughout the planet, an ever-greater "mixing" of races and peoples, a growing number of mixed marriages; 15), the global spread of English as a means of international communication.

Some may dislike these unifying processes, certain of their negative consequences may be condemned, but one thing is sure: they are real, they are happening before our eyes. (Remember how the world was only 70 or 80 years ago, when the generation still living was born!) The globalization of morals is less noticeable, but it too is inevitably taking place, because without it the above trends cannot fully become realities. All the urgent errands of humanity's development and, in part, the modern struggles against terrorism require not only political, diplomatic and military efforts, but also ethical support. Only truly humane universal morals for mankind can help overcome evil in the world and yet avoid the excesses once cautioned against by Nietzsche: "Those who fight monsters should take care not to become monsters themselves."

Those who do not want the unification of the planet, and those who do not believe in it, most often allege that the growth of nationalism in the modern world makes such a union impossible. But in fact these two processes — the consolidation of humanity and the strengthening of national identity — are not mutually exclusive. They can develop in parallel, in dialectical unity — provided that the supporters of both currents manage to avoid extremism. The possibility of such a development was foreseen by Berdyaev as early as 1918; his conclusions fully apply to our time: "The existence of humanity as embodied in its parts' national ways of life inevitably reflects the zoological, lowest state of mutual animosity and annihilation, which disappears along with the growth of humaneness and unity. <...> A sense of being a citizen of the universe does not at all mean losing a sense of national feeling or national citizenship" [19, p. 93, 95] Chaadaev also wrote of this: "Nationalities freed of their misunderstandings and biases will no longer serve the purpose, as they did before, of merely separating people, but will begin to combine with each other in a way that will produce a harmonious univeral result, and we perhaps we might see peoples extending their hands to one another with the proper consciousness of humanity's common interest, which would then be nothing other than the properly understood interest of each distinct nationality" [27, p. 102]. It can be hoped that this approach would permit a solution to one of the most fundamental, painful contradictions of our era — the contradiction between globalism and nationalism.

Of course, any historical perspective is subject to ambivalence, and one alternative to humanity's unity is the world-corroding disease of national and religious hatred in its most extreme, inhuman forms. This danger, no less formidable than that of fascism and communism in the 20th century, must be overcome not only by force of arms but by strength of spirit, that is, by realizing universal human moral criteria. To save itself, humanity must unwaveringly expand the field of action for moral criteria, making absolute morals' utopian dream a reality.

In its historical development, humanity has approached absolute morals with an ever-greater speed — at first slowly, then faster and faster — like an exponential mathematical function, aiming for the farthest limits of its meaning. Theoretically, absolute morals are as unattainable as the limit of a function, because no individual can have full moral perfection. And yet, the greater the number of people attempting to follow these morals' principles, the closer humanity as a whole will be to them. The movement toward absolute morals is unstoppable, just as it's impossible to stop the search for scientific truth in the natural sciences — both processes will continue as long as there is a human race. But while absolute truth, that eternally elusive goal of scientific investigation, resists formulation in advance, humanity learned of absolute morals long ago — no more is needed than for all people to see them as an ideal aim for their moral development.

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